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with him.I. Introduction
Much of what may be coined the creeping degradation of the
environment is due to economic projects which are subject to
public approval. The erection of buildings, the siting of facto-
ries, all require permission from bureaucracies. To answer the
question whether there is too much or not enough of the environ-
ment thus requires an analysis of the criteria under which
private projects are publicly approved.
An omnipotent and benevolent dictator will undertake an
environmentally sensitive project under the safeguards of an
optimal emission control if the public environmental costs are
exceeded by the private net gains from the project, or so the
story goes. To continue the tale, a benevolent bureaucracy
possessing absolute authority over the use of the environment
will permit projects, given optimal safeguards, if the same
condition is fulfilled.
However, bureaucracies are not always benevolent. Even if
they were they almost never possess exclusive property rights
over the environment. Indeed, bureaucracies are nested in a legal
system that usually gives potential project operators the right
to take the case of unapproved projects to a court of appeal.
Furthermore, courts frequently can revise stipulations of envi-
ronmental safeguards imposed by a bureaucracy. As a further
complication of the issue, court decisions are inherently un-
certain. Hence neither the potential project operator nor the
bureaucracy may have an interest in a court battle. What then
determines the conditions under which environmentally sensitive
project are undertaken?
The present paper addresses this issue. It entertains the
view that in a situation where property rights over the envi-
ronment, or vice versa over projects, do not rest exclusively
with the bureaucracy because of uncertain court litigation,
project permits and associated environmental safeguards areessentially the outcome of negotiations between potential project
operators and bureaucracies. '
In what follows the strategic approach to negotiations known
from bargaining theory (RUBINSTEINf1982]) is applied. Conditional
project permits are determined as subgame perfect equilibrium
points (SELTEN[1975]) of games in extensive form. This allows the
determinants of the relative bargaining power that ultimately
determine the environmental safeguards to be brought to the fore.
Amongst these determinants are the values of the "outside option"
of project operators to take their case to the courts. Courts of
appeal are thus important even if they never have to act.
Another important determinant of negotiated environmental
safeguards one would immediately expect is the bureaucracy's
objective. Therefore the case where the bureaucracy represents a
benevolent social planner is compared to the case where it is
solely an advocate of the environment.
In this context, what complicates the issue is that the
discount rate the bureaucracy applies to the negotiation process
for once must be expected to influence the bargaining outcome
and, for another perhaps depends on the bureaucracy's own ob-
jective.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II the,situa-
tion which gives rise to environmental negotiations is. made
precise. In Section III the range of possible negotiated settle-
ments between a bureaucracy and a potential project operator is
determined. The rules under which bargaining takes
1) Apart from conditional project permits there are two major
areas where environmental negotiations take place. First, the
problem of transboundary environmental effects can be tackled
virtually only by international negotiations amongst sovereign
countries (for a theoretical investigation see e.g. KUHL [1987]).
Second, after environmental accidents, firms sued sometimes seek
an out-of-court settlement with those who have suffered from the
accident (the Hoffmann-LaRoche - City of Seveso settlement is a
point in case). Also, bureaucracies sometimes are entitled to
negotiate an out-of-court settlement after an environmental
accident (e.g. the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under
the "Superfund" legislation (BURTON [1988])).place are defined in Section IV, and in Sections V and VI the
bargaining equilibrium is determined. Section VII concludes the
paper.
II. Institutions and the Project
Consider a private project which, if undertaken without environ-
mental safeguards, has a discounted present value n. Suppose,
that - under laissez faire - environmental costs in money terms,
DQ, are associated with this project. If a permit to undertake
the project is conditioned on environmental safeguards, the
private costs of which are S for the project operator, environ-
mental costs are reduced to D(S). We take it that D'(S)<0,
D"(S)>0.
2)
The potential project operator has the right to take the
case to a court of appeal if the project is not permitted by the
bureaucracy or only permitted under additional environmental
safeguards. For the sake of simplicity suppose that neither the
bureaucracy nor the project operator incurs additional costs from
an in-court settlement. Suppose further that the probability that
the project operator wins the court battle is given by k, k>0. If
the project operator wins in court he can proceed with the
project without having to comply with any environmental safe-
guards. If he loses in court, the decision of the bureaucracy is
final. ' For the sake of simplicity, take it that all decision
makers are risk neutral. The model is closed by a specification
of the objective of the bureaucracy.
2) The project thus is the one presumed in PORTER [1988]. There,
however, potential project operators and consumers negotiate
environmental safeguards. Furthermore, the bargaining process
itself is not analysed, with the consequence that negotiated
environmental safeguards are only vaguely determined.
3) Time costs of court battles and court decisions differing from
the positions of either the project operator or the bureaucracy
can be included.Usually, bureaucracies have a degree of freedom. For one,
they often can exert discretion within their legally defined
capacity to judge and evaluate. And beyond that, the legal
framework may not succeed in uniquely defining and imposing
7 an
objective on a bureaucracy. To represent this, we allow for two
alternative objectives for the bureaucracy in charge of project
permits:
Case 1 (Pluralism): The bureaucracy takes up the case of a social
planner and maximizes E[TT-S-D(S) ].
Case 2 (Environmental Advocacy): The bureaucracy minimizes
E[D(S)].
For reference these two cases are to be compared to the case
of a social planner. A social planner has exclusive property
rights over the environment, or alternatively the projects, and
• • • *
maximizes ir-S-D(S). The optimal environmental safeguard, S ,
*
satisfies -D'(S)=1, and the project is undertaken if TC-S -D>0,
* *
where D =D(S ). The social optimum is given by F in Diagram 1.
k Do
Diagram 1





Below we consider a project for which this inequality is ful-
filled.
Optimal environmental safeguards, S , are undertaken for
example if a pluralistic bureaucracy (Case 1) possesses exclusive
property rights over the environment, or alternatively theproject (see e.g. SIEBERT[1987]). The existence of a court of
appeal such that neither the bureaucracy nor the potential
project operator possesses exclusive rights over the environment
is a crucial prerequisite that negotiations take place. Under
non-exclusive property rights the parties involved, i.e. the
bureaucracy and the potential project operator, have an incentive
to make concessions in order to avoid an uncertain court battle.
III. The Range of Negotiated Environmental Safeguards
The subject under negotiation is the distribution of the gross
value of the project between the project operator and the bu-
reaucracy. This distribution of the project value is achieved by
an agreement on environmental safeguards,S
n, to be applied during
the operation of the project. Associated with the negotiated
safeguards, S




In determining their readiness to make concessions, the
parties compare the certain costs of a negotiated settlement with
the expected costs arising from a court decision. The project
operator prefers a negotiated settlement over a court decision if
S
n < (l-k).S* (Case 1)
S
n < (l-k)»n. (Case 2)
(1)
The project operator's willingness to make concessions differs in
the two cases because a pluralistic bureaucracy's stance in a
court battle is at variance with the one of an environmental
advocate.
Given the social optimality of the project, a pluralistic
bureaucracy pleads for a conditional project permit under envi-
ronmental safeguards, S . Hence all that the project operator can
lose in a court battle is S . However, if he is confronted with
an environmental advocate he may lose the entire projectvalue, rc, as the bureaucracy pleads in court for an unconditional
refusal of the project permit.
 ;
The bureaucracy prefers an out-of-court settlement if
S
n+D
n £ (l-k)-(D*+S*) + k-DQ (Case 1)
D
n £ k«Dn. (Case 2)
Although preventing the project altogether is the first-best
result for an advocate of the environment (Case 2), the bureauc-
racy is willing to give a conditional permit if the associated
environmental damage, D
n, is not larger than the expected damage
under a court decision, k»DQ.
 I
n addition, a pluralistic bureauc-
racy (Case 1) will take into account the costs of environmental
safeguards, S
n. Furthermore, the expected costs of a court
decision include the weighted costs associated with a court
decision in favour of the bureaucracy, (l-k)»(D +S ).
The potential project operator is willing to accept some
environmental safeguards without appealing to the courts if k<l.
Likewise, the bureaucracy, whatever its objective, is prepared to
give some leeway in negotiations if k>0.
In Diagram 1 a project is depicted for which under both Case
1 and Case 2 negotiations over the environment can take place. In
Case 2 the range of negotiable environmental safeguards is given
by the interval between C and E on D(S). In Case 1 negotiable
safeguards are represented by the interval between A and B, where
Sx satisfies S1+D(S1) = (1-k)•(D*+S*) + k«DQ.
It should be noted, however, that bargaining between the
bureaucracy and a potential project operator need not necessarily
be possible. Consider for example Case 2. If Dfl is small enough,
C is located to the right of E. Then the maximal environmental
safeguards the project operator is willing to tolerate is smaller
4) If ix-D -S £ 0 the pluralistic bureaucracy also pleads for the
abandonment of the project. In this case the distinction between
the objectives of the bureaucracy is irrelevant.than the minimal safeguards the bureaucracy is prepared to
concede. The environmental damage caused by the project under
unconditional operation is simply too small as to pose a sub-
stantial threat for the bureaucracy.
Interestingly for the project under consideration, socially
optimal environmental safeguards are impossible in both cases if
0<k<l, i.e. under non-exclusive property rights over the environ-
ment. This must be modified under either of two conditions.
First, if side-payments between the parties to environmental
negotiation are feasible, socially optimal safeguards are possi-
ble (see e.g. KUHL [1987]). However, for legal reasons side-pay-
ments from potential project operators to bureaucracies or vice
versa are not a widespread real world phenomenon. I therefore
have abstracted from them.
Second, if DQ is large enough C is situated to the left of
F. In this case socially optimal safeguards, S , can be negoti-
ated if the bureaucracy is an advocate of the environment. To see
whether S can be the outcome of negotiations or, more generally,
to determine which of the negotiable environmental safeguards
will be agreed upon requires, however, an analysis of the bar-
gaining process that preceeds such a negotiated settlement. We
address this issue next.
IV. Bargaining
Following the strategic approach to negotiations, negotiated
environmental safeguards must be an equilibrium point of a game
in extensive form, defined by the rules of bargaining. Consider
the bargaining game depicted in Diagram 2. '
5) This bargaining game is an application of a modified version




















At time t=0 a potential project operator (A) applies for a
project permit and the bureaucracy (B) decides on the issue. If
it grants unconditional permission then the game ends. If it
rejects the project unconditionally then the case is settled in
court. ' The value of a court settlement for the potential
project operator and the bureaucracy is eA and eB respectively.
These values are defined as fractions of the value of the pro-
ject, it. Litigation thus is an outside option for the parties by
which they can quit negotiations without having reached an
agreement.
The bureaucracy need not take either of these alternatives.
It can continue bargaining by making a formal or informal coun-
ter-proposal in t=l. This counter-proposal could take the form of
a project permit subject to additional environmental safeguards.
If the potential project operator rejects the proposal of the
bureaucracy in t=l it can take the case to the courts or make a
counter-proposal in turn in t=2. The bargaining game ends if
either party takes the outside option or if it accepts an offer
made.
6) Note that under the assumptions made, the potential project
operator always has an incentive to appeal in court if the
bureaucracy unconditionally rejects the projects. This need not
be the case. Costly litigation or the possibility of the court
taking a stance which is even harder than that of the bureaucracy
reduces this incentive.10
Time costs of bargaining occur because counter-offers can
only be made after one period has elapsed. This is represented by
a discount factor h. and hB, 0<h , hg£l, for the project operator
and the bureaucracy respectively. The discount factor applied to
bargaining by the bureaucracy, hB, depends on its objective.
The potential project operator's discount factor is deter-
mined by the interest rate on profits it can make when running
the project. That is, h^l*
 A pluralistic bureaucracy takes these
interest costs into account and sets
hB = hA < 1. (3)
A bureaucracy which is an advocate of the environment,
however, suffers no time costs of bargaining because the project
value rt does not enter the bureaucracy's objective. During
negotiations it therefore sets
hB = 1. (4)
The outside option to search litigation can constitute a
threat in negotiations and thus can impinge on the relative
bargaining power. However, this requires that the threat to
search a court battle be credible. If parties are rational, such
a threat by one party is incredible whenever continued bargaining
leads to a more favourable outcome for that party than uncertain
litigation.
An impact of incredible threats on the outcome of negotia-
tions can be ruled out by requiring that bargaining strategies
are subgame perfect (SELTEN [1975]). ' The bargaining solution
then is given by the subgame perfect equilibrium.
7) Subgame perfectness is a necessary and sufficient condition
for threats to be credible in the present game, as, by assump-
tion, the bargaining game ends when litigation begins. Whenever
the game continues after a threat is executed conditions on the
credibility of threats are much stronger (MOHR [1988]).11
To determine the subgame perfect equilibrium note that the
size of the cake to be divided in environmental negotiations is
given by it. In Case 1 the value of the outside option for the








From a comparison of equations (5) and (6) it readily follows
that the outside option for both parties is larger in Case 1 than
in Case 2. This is so because in Case 1 the project operator does
not run the risk of losing the project in court. And in Case 1
the bureaucracy can balance the positive net private gains from
the project against the environmental costs.
Following the method outlined in SUTTON [1986] to determine
the subgame perfect bargaining equilibrium, let m be the supremum
of the share of K the potential project operator can reap in a
negotiated settlement in period 2, say. Then, by backward induc-
tion, the shares the potential project operator (A) and the
bureaucracy (B) can reap by an earlier negotiated settlement are
those depicted in Box 1 where
































Solving the first row in Box 1 for m, we obtain the share
the potential project operator receives in a subgame perfect
bargaining equilibrium. It is given by




m = l-hB.(l-eA) if
eA > hw« A A
(9)
LeB<hB.(l-eA)/
m = 1-eB otherwise. (10)
We are now ready to determine the publicly approved private
provision of safeguards for environmentally sensitive projects.Btbliothek
d©s Instituts fur Weltwirtschaft
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V. Environmental Advocacy
If the bureaucracy is an environmental advocate, for the equili-
brium partition (8)-(10) we obtain from equation (4)





m = e, if 4
eA>0
(12)
m = 1-eB otherwise. (13)
From the values of the outside option (6) eB<l-e =l-k and hence
the equilibrium partition of rc is given by (12). From the upper
equation in (6) it then follows from (12) that
m = k (14)
if the bureaucracy is an environmental advocate.
Associated with the equilibrium partition (14) is a condi-
tional project permit requiring environmental safeguards, S
n, to
be undertaken by the project operator. Hence the project oper-
ator's share in the cake under negotiations, it, is given by
m»rc = it-S
n. From equation (14) equilibrium environmental safe-
guards are thus given by
,n S = (l-k)«n. (15)
The bargaining equilibrium in Case 2 thus is given by E in
Diagram 1. The project operator accepts costs from environmental
safeguards equal to the entire costs it has to expect from a14
court decision. The bargaining power rests exclusively with the
bureaucracy.
The intuition behind this transpires from Diagram 2. As the
environment remains in the first-best state for as long as
negotiations take place the bureaucracy's outside option to
trigger a court decision is incredible. This, however, requires
that the outside option for the potential project operator must
be credible, or else an agreement would never be reached. Thus
the bureaucracy can at most require costs from environmental
safeguards equal to (l-k)»n. Apparently the bureaucracy has no
incentive to settle for less.
The bargaining solution under environmental advocacy is
socially optimal only if E and F coincide in Diagram 1. As S <Tt
for any project which to undertake is socially optimal, there
exists a k, 0<k<l, for which this is indeed the case . Further-
more, for large enough DQ, C remains to the left of E. A socially
optimal provision of environmental safeguards cannot therefore be
ruled out.
However, the value of k is determined by factors specific to
the legal system. Furthermore k may be interpreted as an index
for the ex ante distribution of non-exclusive titles to the
environment. Environmental policy therefore can function only
indirectly. Environmental laws and stipulations of bureaucratic
procedures affect the provision of environmental safeguards only
in as much as they affect the distribution of uncertain titles to
the environment.
That environmental policy can be effectuated by inflicting
on environmental property rights implicitly defined by the
reputation of a court of appeal perhaps is not surprising. The
result obtained here, however, is stronger. It suggests that no
other environmental policy instrument exists if the bureaucracy
is an advocate of the environment. In particular, environmental
policy cannot influence the bargaining power of potential project
operators. It is always nil.15
VI. Pluralistic Bureaucracy
If the bureaucracy is pluralistic, from equation (3) h=hB=h<l.
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TT ,
From m»Tt = Ti-S






n = h.(l-k)»S* (20)
and
S
n = Tt-(l-k)«(S*+D*)-k»D0. (21)
The bargaining solution in Case 1 depends on the availability of
a credible outside option for the parties. Environmental safe-
guards represented in Diagram 1 by points on D(S) to the left of
A represent safeguards for which the bureaucracy's threat to
trigger a court decision is credible. The threat point for the
project operator is G in Diagram 1. In G environmental safeguards16
are given by h«(l-k)»S (equation(20)). To the right of G the
project operator's outside option is credible.
To see that G instead of B is the project operator's threat
point return to Diagram 2. As to the right of A in Diagram 1 the
outside option of the bureaucracy is incredible the game ends at
the earliest in period t=l if the bureaucracy turns down an offer
in t=0, say. The project operator can take advantage of the
bureaucracy's impatience in that he needs only offer safeguards
equal to the discounted expected costs of a court decision,
h»(l-k)»S / in order to obtain a permit for the project.
If by forgoing its outside option the project operator has
to accept safeguards in excess of h»(l-k)»S , then the bargaining
solution is given by G in Diagram 1. Environmental safeguards
agreed upon, then are given by equation (20).
If by forgoing its outside option the bureaucracy has to
accept an environmental damage such that triggering a court
decision would imply a larger gain for the bureaucracy, then the
bargained environmental safeguards are given by equation (21). A
glance at Diagram 2 reveals why the discount factor is not a
determinant of the bargaining solution.
If litigation constitutes a credible threat of the bureauc-
racy then the project operator simply offers safeguards equal to
the expected social net value of the project if safeguards are
determined in court. As in Diagram 1 the interval of possible
bargaining solutions is located on D(S) to the left of the social
optimum, F, -D'(S
n)>l. Offering lower safeguards"than those given
in equation (21) therefore would entice the bureaucracy to seek
immediately a court decision. It is straightforward that under
these conditions the project operator has an incentive neither to
offer nor accept higher safeguards.
As the bureaucracy is indifferent between the bargaining
solution (21) and the expected court decision the upper condition
in (2) holds with equality. In Diagram 1 the bargaining solution
is therefore located on D(S) in A.17




The parties split the value of the project net of environmental
costs.
Equation (22) points to an. interesting fact. The larger the
environmental damage of the project for any given safeguard, the
lower the safeguards the project operator has to observe. This
seemingly implausible result is readily explained in light of
Diagram 1. If D(S) shifts upwards to D(S), for any given k, the
advantage for the bureaucracy from winning in court declines
whereas the threat of losing increases. This lets the bureaucracy
be more lenient in negotiations. Given D(S), the bargaining
solution then is given by A, say, implying lower environmental
safeguards.
Finally, if neither party's outside option is credible then
the bargaining solution is given by equation (19). AS dS
n/dh>0
the share of the cake the project operator obtains is larger, the
larger the common time preference of the bargaining parties. The
project operator can simply take advantage of the fact that he
8 ^ can make the first proposal. '
It should be noted that with a pluralistic bureaucracy the
effectiveness of environmental policy crucially depends on the
regime which applies. If the bargaining equilibrium is given by
equation (19), environmental policy intending to influence the
application of safeguards by changing the ex ante distribution of
9 \ property rights, k, is doomed to fail. '
If either party's threat of taking the outside option is
credible, environmental policy inflicting on k can be effective.
However, the direction of induced changes in equilibrium
8) If bargaining takes place continuously then the first mover
advantage disappears. Equation (19) then reduces to S = l/2it.
The parties equally split the gross project value.
9) However, k influences the range in which the equilibrium is
given by equation (19). Thus environmental policy can trigger a
change of regime.18
safeguards differs with the regimes. If only the project oper-
ator's outside option is credible then from equation (20)
6S
n/Sk<0. Reducing the project operator's ex ante title to the
environment reduces his bargaining power and thus increases his
leniency to accept higher environmental safeguards.
If the bureaucracy's outside option is credible then from
equation (21) 6S
n/Sk = S +D -DQ=0. Reducing the project opera-
tor's ex ante title to the environment increases the application
* *
of environmental safeguards only if, for given S +D , -DQ is
smaller than some critical value.
Intuitively, the bargaining power of the bureaucracy can
decrease if k declines because a smaller k increases the incen-
tive of the bureaucracy to trigger a court decision. However, it
is the taking of this option which is a necessary precondition
that the bureaucracy can lose in court the title to all of the
environment. If this loss is associated with large enough costs,
D«, the bureaucracy's bargaining power decreases if environmental
policy increases the bureaucracy's rights over the environment.
VII. Conclusions
The paper identifies severe limitations to the efficiency of
environmental policy in constitutional democracies. If bureaucra-
cies are nested in a legal system that guarantees the right of
appeal in court, environmental safeguards specified in condition-
al project permits are socially suboptimal. In general, this is
so irrespective of whether the bureaucracy acts as a social
planner or as a pure advocate of the environment. Furthermore, if
the objective of the bureaucracy is unknown to policy makers,
stipulated environmental safeguards can be socially too low or
too high.19
Even if the direction in which to improve on the social
benefit is known, environmental policy can cause a further
departure from the social optimum if the regime, under which
safeguards are determinded, is unknown to policy makers. Or it
can happen that policy makers possess complete knowledge of the
conditions under which safeguards are set, yet incremental
environmental policy is completely ineffective.
The gist of the analysis therefore seems to be that effec-
tive environmental policy conflicts with the objective of the
trichotomy of governmental powers. If the environment becomes
increasingly scarce the constitutional democracy may be increas-
ingly put under pressure.20
Bibliography
BURTON, Lloyd [1988], "Negotiating the Cleanup of Toxic Ground-
water Contamination: Strategy and Legitimacy", Natural Resources
Journal, 28, 105-143.
KUHL, Heiner [1987], "Umweltressourcen als Geqenstand internatio-
naler Verhandlunqen, Frankfurt: Peter Lang.
MOHR, Ernst [1988], "On the Incredibility of Perfect Threats in
Repeated Games: Note", International Economic Review, 29, 551-555.
PORTER, Richard [1988], "Environmental Negotiations: Its Poten-
tial and Its Economic Efficiency", Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, 15, 129-142.
RUBINSTEIN, Ariel [1982], "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining
Model", Econometrica, 50, 97-109.
SELTEN, Reinhard [1975], Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept
for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games", International Journal
of Game Theory, 4, 25-55.
SIEBERT, Horst [1987], Economics of the Environment, Berlin:
Springer, Second Edition.
SUTTON, John [1986], "Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An
Introduction", Review of Economic Studies, 53, 709-724.